

Dogmatist Experientialism and the supposed Forcefulness of Perceptual Experience

Abstract

Dogmatist experientialism holds that perceptual experiences can evidentially justify perceptual beliefs. In the face of a specific version of the Sellarsian dilemma, this account is ad hoc; the dogmatist experientialist needs to explain what is so distinct about perceptual experience that enables it to fulfill its evidential role without being itself in need of justification. I argue that an experience's property of forcefulness cannot be used to answer this question: this property either consists of an epistemic attitude that is in need of justification itself, or it is doubtful that there even is such a property. The distinctness of perceptual experience might just stem from a higher-order belief that the experience is a perceptual one, but this is of no help to the dogmatist experientialist.