THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE AND EROTETIC IMPLICATION
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There are many conceptual queries about knowledge. In my *Truth, knowledge, and presupposition* I have dealt with some of them with the result of relaxing the truth-requirement in the tripartite definition of knowledge. This, however, does solve neither classical problems arising from Gettier paradoxes, nor some problems that have not received much attention so far. They include, i.a., the questions of accounting for the interrelations between knowledge and justification and of telling knowledge from reliable and true information.

Concerning the latter, one suggestion is that knowledge and mere information differ in their roles in problem-solving activities. Thus the appropriate framework of the attempted conceptual analysis is that of erotetic logic. It will be argued that

(i) a justified and not-false answer to an implying question counts as knowledge;
(ii) whether such an answer is justified or not depends on the epistemic status of d-wff’s in the relevant erotetic argument;
(iii) an experiential answer to an implied question counts as information but not necessarily as knowledge;
(iv) the answer to an implied question that is entailed by a known answer to an implying question and known d-wff’s in the relevant erotetic argument is justified but need not count as knowledge.

The above general epistemological claims can be applied to the analysis of scientific knowledge to conclude that:

(i) positively tested, not-false universal hypotheses count as knowledge;
(ii) predictions derived from known hypotheses count as justified beliefs but not knowledge.

The analysis on offer enables us to explain, among other things, why scientific knowledge, despite its hypothetical character and much idealizations involved, is knowledge at all, how justified beliefs that are not knowledge themselves may nevertheless play a role in knowledge-acquisition, and why scientific knowledge does not yield any knowledge about the future even though it yields justified expectations that more often than not come true.