

ASIA PAPER

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Europe's normative disconnect with the emerging powers

Executive summary – In the last decade, the European Union has gone to great lengths to socialize the emerging powers with its own norms. In vain. This paper presents new evidence that Europe failed to reach consensus with countries like Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa on how to address major international challenges.

It also shows that there is a growing disconnect between Europe's normative standards and those of the new giants. Voting positions in the framework of the United Nations have grown apart. Countries like China, India and Russia now actively work with the majority of developing countries to promote a new generation of international standards. This **reverse socialization** will negatively affect Europe's position.

Whereas the European Union considers dialogues with the BRICS countries as an indication of successful engagement, these mechanisms are hardly productive. A closer look at regional trouble spots and global challenges like climate change shows that a growing **normative disconnect** has impeded cooperation. Added to the fact that the European Union is not considered as an influential actor, the power politics of the new juggernauts has weakened Europe's position.

Europe's political values could become more attractive if the emerging markets continue to develop and strengthen national unity. But for the short term the emphasis should be to make sure that these standards are maintained internally. **Europe also needs to modernize its hard economic, political and even military capabilities** if it wants to have a chance as a normative power in the long run. If it manages to maintain its economic competitiveness and raises its political effectiveness, Europe would inevitably obtain a stronger bargaining position in the new power politics of this century. Not strong enough to impose normative conditions, but sufficient to ensure that its core interests are not harmed and that it maintains confidence in itself.

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Abstract. This paper presents new evidence of the growing normative disconnect between Europe and the emerging powers. Not only within multilateral organizations both sides seem to diverge in terms of their normative preferences. Several dialogues that were set up with the European Union failed to produce tangible results because of persistent disagreement over the standards that should underpin international politics. This should not lead the European Union to abandon its political values, but instead of trying to socialize the new giants, it should make sure that its own internal problems are properly addressed. The EU will only be able to wield normative power if it is recognized as a leader in economic performance, political effectiveness and social stability. *Key words:* normative power, multilateralism and socialization.

1. Introduction

"The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule based international order is our objective," the European Union highlighted in its 2003 Security Strategy.¹ Europe assumed that the rules that would underpin this new international order were to be founded on its own liberal political norms, its views of an open global market and its preference for highly institutionalized multilateralism. In the same vein, Europe's prospect for developing closer relations with the emerging powers rested to a large extent on the belief that the latter would adapt their diplomatic norms to European standards. Normative convergence was thus the key for strategic partnerships with new protagonists.

This paper argues that the objective of building solid partnerships with countries like Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa has not been achieved. On the one hand, a persistent normative disconnect between

the two sides impeded pragmatic collaboration to tackle international challenges. On the other, the European Union was not able to deliver in those areas where a basic consensus about the *rules of the game* was possible. Europe risks isolation and strategic redundancy if it does not modify its posture. As the emerging markets became more influential, their struggle for national unity has increasingly invigorated other developing countries to pursue state-centric policies and to use international organizations to defend their interests. This is not to say that the EU's norms are unjust or irrelevant. They might become increasingly attractive if the new pretenders succeed to reach a sufficient level of development and internal stability. For its normative power to be successful in the long run, Europe will first need to reinvent the sources of hard power: economic competitiveness, political effectiveness and reliable military capabilities.

The analysis of this paper will be developed at three levels. First, it examines the intensity of interaction between the European Union and the emerging powers Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa. What are the communication channels and how institutionalized have they become? Second, it analyses whether there has been more intensive cooperation on key international issues. Therefore it covers major priorities that were listed in the European Security Strategy and other policy documents: regional conflicts and failed states, climate change and the promotion of effective multilateralism. Finally, this study appraises to what extent eventual shifts in the quality of collaboration testify of the recognition of the European Union as an international power and a convergence towards Europe in terms of norms.

2. The postmodern premises of the European Union's foreign policy

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 sketched out the normative guidelines of the European Union's foreign policy. It enshrined common values like democracy, rule of law and human rights as priorities for the development of the Union's foreign relations.² About a decade later, these principles were reaffirmed during the Laeken Summit: "Europe is the continent of humane

values, the Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity... The European Union's one boundary is democracy and human rights. The Union is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law."³ The European Security Strategy of 2003 also highlighted the importance of common European values in international affairs. "Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order," it stated.⁴ These principles were to be promoted via both multilateral channels and constructive engagement toward developing countries.⁵ What the European Union defined as a distinctive feature of its foreign policy was the use of persuasion and attraction to influence other states. Instead of coercion and unilateralism, synergies had to expose them to European values. "A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens," the European Security Strategy claimed.

It was this attempt to transplant the conditions of its own sphere of freedom and security to other parts of the world by means of persuasion that gave Europe the identity of a postmodern power.⁶ Its approach implied a double departure from the power politics that characterized the international order during and before the Cold War. Most importantly, it introduced an alternative construction of international anarchy. Policy visions like the Security Strategy did not assume that all threats would vanish, but it was supposed that rivalry between the major powers could be set aside for cooperation that was needed to tackle new threats like financial instability, terrorism, global warming and failing states. The need to address non-traditional threats against states could offset traditional threats among states. As a consequence, the modus of international relations had to be changed as well. "Even those who insist on sovereignty find themselves enmeshed in a range of cooperative institutions," Robert Cooper asserted.⁷ Normative power was deemed to be the most effective source of leverage for influencing other states' decisions. The European Union itself had to

form an objective for neighbouring states and an example for more distant countries.⁸

Prolonged exposure to Europe's own preferences and policies was believed to promote a greater socialization and a convergence in terms of the norms that underpin state's behavior. States can disagree over issues, but what is key is that institutionalized dialogues engender norms to disagree in a peaceful way and that competition is carried out in a way that is not at the expense of international stability and the preservation of these norms.⁹ The obvious precondition for such a strategy is that exchanges with partner states became broader and more intensive.¹⁰ Avenues for interaction were commercial linkages, a comprehensive matrix of policy exchanges, and public diplomacy.¹¹

3. Evaluating the institutional framework of cooperation with the new powers

The European Union has thus recognized the strengthening of communication and coordination with the emerging powers on international challenges as a key priority for reaching a consensus on common priorities and standards in international politics. Strengthening means both institutionalization and aiming at more policy outputs.¹² A first option is to conclude agreements that provide specific guidelines and targets for cooperation. In the past ten years Europe has inked agreements with the emerging states on issues like the security of sensitive information, peacekeeping, the combat against terrorism or proliferation.¹³ Since 2003, Europe has signed 24 new agreements and protocols with BRICS – here defined as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – countries, but only three of them related to international political and security issues, compared to twenty on economic issues.

A second possibility is to foresee in specific clauses, articles or sections in strategic partnership and cooperation agreements (PCA). In 1997, such a document was finalized with Russia. Brussels hopes to coax China into a similar agreement by 2011.¹⁴ With India, South Africa and

Brazil the European Union developed Action Plans in 2005, 2007 and 2008. Similar to the partnership and cooperation agreements, they formalized the main priorities for cooperation and coordination on the middle-long term. But how much guidance have they been providing regarding international political and security issues? For the four major documents we divided all the clauses into four categories: international politics, internal politics, environment and economy. A total of 78 clauses could be labelled this way. As figure one shows, there is a clear trade bias. As many as 52 clauses were related to economic priorities and initiatives; 14 to non-economic international areas of interest. The action plans with Brazil and India contain significantly more joint international priorities than the agreement with Russia of 1997, and it is foreseeable that if the PCA with China would be completed, it would also foresee in a more ambitious agenda for coordination and cooperation on international issues. Nevertheless, the trade bias in the quantity of clauses remains. Moreover, the modest number of international priorities tends to be vaguer than most of the economic or environmental issues, which foresee in much more specific joint initiatives.

This asymmetry is also visible in the joint statements. Since 2008, Europe has annual summits with all five BRICS countries (with Russia it has one summit a semester). Summits are intended to follow up on the implementation of joint strategies or action plans, and to discuss new initiatives whenever required. A joint statement that reaffirms or expands the areas of cooperation follows each summit. Like the bilateral agreements, we categorized the different clauses of the summit statements of 2008 (2007 for China) into four categories. A total of 93 clauses over five statements could be listed in this way. Fifty two clauses discussed economic matters; 24 were priorities pertaining to international issues. With India, China and South Africa Europe achieved more emphasis on diplomatic and security topics like UN reform, terrorism, peacekeeping, and even individual problem states like Myanmar Afghanistan and Zimbabwe. But these clauses were mainly limited to expressing concern or interest instead of sketching out clear measures for coordination.




Figure 1. Clauses in the European Union's agreements, statements and sectoral dialogues with BRICCS countries categorized in four main sectors (number). Sources: International agreement database of the EU: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>; The India-EU Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan, Brussels, 7 September 2005; The South Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan, Brussels, 15 May 2007; Brazil-European Union Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan, Rio, 22 December 2008; First EU-South Africa Summit Joint Statement, Bordeaux, 25 July 2008; Second Brazil-European Union Summit Joint Statement, Rio, 22 December, 2008; EU-India Joint Summit Press Communiqué, Marseille, 29 September 2007; EU-China Joint Summit Statement, Beijing, 28 November 2007.

A fourth indicator of the degree of institutionalization of communication and coordination on international challenges is the number of relevant sectoral dialogues or working groups set up. These forums fill the gap between minister-level and track-II exchanges, and play an important role in the implementation and further development of joint policies. By 2008, the European Union had established 65 sectoral dialogues or working groups with the BRICS countries, of which 50 are active in economic areas and only five in the field of security and diplomacy. With India it started a security dialogue in 2007. With Russia it has an additional dialogue on mine clearance, but this one is reported to be inactive.¹⁵ In the past few years, the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC/COPS) has

had sporadic non-institutionalized meetings with representatives from China, India and South Africa. These meetings tend to dwell over a broad range of international issues without any commitment for joint agenda setting or policymaking.¹⁶

Political exchanges between the European Union and the major emerging countries have been proliferating. Communication, coordination and cooperation have become more institutionalized by means of cooperation agreements or action plans, specific agreements, summit meetings and sectoral dialogues. Progress however has essentially occurred in economic areas. With regard to international political and security issues, the European Union has hardly reached consensus with the emerging markets on the priorities and channels for cooperation. Even though international challenges have become slightly more important in recent policy documents; they were rarely translated into concrete policies than economic priorities.

4. Cooperation in Practice

Practice is of course the ultimate test of convergence between the EU and the BRICS on norms and rules for promoting international cooperation. Therefore we will look at the involvement of both sides in major issues flagged as priorities for cooperation. The issues are: strengthening regional and global multilateralism¹⁷, working together in peacekeeping, maintaining stability in Africa¹⁸, mitigating climate change¹⁹, and addressing specific local security problems like Myanmar and North Korea²⁰.

Strengthening **multilateralism** in the first place implies cooperation within the United Nations and streamlining positions on its reform. The General Assembly of the UN might not be the most powerful body, but it is a useful barometer for the level of consensus between its members. Resolutions can be voted more flexibly as there is no weighty veto procedure. Resolutions also cover a wide range of international issues: from the global economic order to proliferation or the situation in Zimbabwe. For the European member states we calculated the modus of their voting

positions and then compared this preference to the voting position of the five BRICS countries over more than 550 resolutions between 2001 and 2008. Since 2001, positions between the EU and the BRICS countries have become more incongruent. In 2001-2002, votes matched in 56 percent of the resolutions, in 2003-2004 this was the same, in 2005-2006 it dropped to 51 percent and in 2007-2008 to 49 percent. Looking at countries individually, the trend has been most outspoken for Brazil and Russia. In 2001, more than eighty percent of Russia's votes matched with the EU; whereas in 2008 this was just 47 percent. Brazil's congruence with the EU declined from 97 to 57 percent. For South Africa and China there was a significant convergence in 2002, but since then, congruence levels remained stable around fifty percent. India too saw an increase in 2002, but its voting patterns have been deviating from the EU

“Resolutions between 2001 and 2008. Since 2001, positions between the EU and the BRICS countries have become more incongruent.”

ever since. Calculating the correlation for all the 550 resolutions, the average correlation between the BRICS countries was fifty percent; while the average correlation between the individual BRICS states and the EU states was only 50 percent. Two conclusions follow from these trends. First, there has been a divergence in the formulation of norms and rules in regard to the issues discussed in the General Assembly of the UN. Second, cooperation between the EU and the BRICS nations has remained negligible compared to the coordination among the members of the BRICS quintet.

Within the UN Security Council Russia and China pursue non-confrontational opposition: trying to mould the drafting of resolutions throughout the process of informal consultations between the P5 representations in New York, abstaining from interventionist resolutions, and making critical public comments afterwards.²¹ As long as resolutions did not affect their core interests or the security of diplomatic allies, Beijing and Moscow seize upon differences to strengthen their role as guardians of sovereignty among third world countries, rather than risking complete stalemates.²² It has been a more common practice to threaten vetoes than to ward off resolutions sponsored by the United States and its European allies.

In 2007, it blocked a resolution that foresaw in far-ranging sanctions against Myanmar. In 2008, it torpedoed a similar resolution against Zimbabwe, which would "unavoidably interfere with the negotiation process and lead to the further deterioration of the situation."²³ In spite of these two vetoes and the persistent critique of interference, it has been argued that China in particular is becoming more flexible in approving limited sanctions and expanding the mandates of peacekeeping operations. During the height crisis in Darfur and the nuclear muscle flexing of Iran and North Korea, it did even call on these states to show restraint and to comply with the expectations of the P5: to permit peacekeepers in case of Sudan and to stop with the development of uranium enrichment in case of the latter two. These gestures of concern have not distracted Beijing from its opposition against tighter sanctions because of its fear that destabilizing regimes in neighboring countries could be graver threat than nuclear arms or gross violations against human rights, because of the genuine fear that further isolating countries like the DPRK and Iran will be counterproductive and because of China's nationalism makes political leaders cautious of being seen as kowtowing to the West.




Figure 2. Matching votes between the EU (modus; R=0,87) and selected powers as a share (percent) of total votes (N=550). Source: figures compiled from UN resolutions database.

The BRICS have also increasingly engaged with regional multilateral organizations to advance their interests.²⁴ The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attracted the interest of China, India and Russia, with China and India being part of the ASEAN+3 (APT). China and Russia are the protagonists in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and in 2006, India was admitted as an observer. India is the pivotal player within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Brazil drives the integration within the *Southern Common Market* (MERCOSUR); South Africa the Southern African Development Community (SADC). On average, each BRICS country is affiliated with 14 regional organizations. While Europe has been the father modern regional cooperation and integration most new sprouts of regionalization are found elsewhere. The European Union has been trying to respond to this trend by promoting interregional cooperation and to engage the regional powers to this end.

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Yet, Europe has been confronted systematically with regional values opposite to its own. In many ways, the kind of regional cooperation that is backed by the BRICS serves the protection of sovereignty rather than integration. Growing economic integration notwithstanding, non-interference and state-centric economic development have remained prominent principles. At several occasions Europe's calls on regional bodies to exert pressure on autocratic regimes like those in *Aristidien* Haiti, Myanmar and Zimbabwe fell on deaf ears. A recent phenomenon is the pursuit of *unilateral multilateralism*. The BRICS increasingly form their own sub-regional organizations. This form of competitive regionalization allows them to project their influence more effectively compared to their rivals, while the smaller members assume to reap larger benefits. Mostly, these constituencies are located in a juggernaut's immediate proximity, but China and India for example have also established regional cooperation platforms in Latin America, the Middle East and Africa.²⁵ Economic exchanges are on top of these forums' agenda, but particularly in the case of China, political

values are promoted as well. The emphasis on safeguarding sovereignty, non-interference and respect for “independent choices of development paths in line with the national conditions” runs as a red line throughout recent joint declarations.²⁶ Russia is setting the same tone in its Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC). What the European Union has thus failed to recognize, is that enmeshing the giants in a multilateral framework will not automatically lead to cooperation, coordination or normative convergence. The reality is that the BRICS countries are enmeshing a larger number of small countries in their own multilateral networks for the sake of their own interests. Competitive multilateralism has led to normative incongruence and reverse socialization.

The BRICS countries have filled a large part of the vacuum that was left after the European member states retreated from UN **peacekeeping**.²⁷ While the number of European peacekeeper and observers declined from 7,430 in 2000 to 3,400 in 2008; the BRICS countries increased their contribution from 3,225 to 17,721.²⁸ True, the European member states still foot about 40 percent of the peacekeeping budget, but China, India and Brazil have made use of the low level of Western engagement to profile themselves as generous contributors to world peace.²⁹ Beyond its relevance for the BRICS states’ soft power, peacekeeping also serves their strategic interests. For relatively underfinanced armed forces like those of India, Brazil and South Africa, UN missions are a vital opportunity for keeping soldiers on the payroll and allowing them to gain some operational experience.³⁰ China more and more uses UN operations to strengthen its military presence in Africa. In the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, Chinese peacekeepers keep an eye on construction and energy projects. Their presence is also contributing to goodwill among local political elites threatened by armed factions. The BRICS’ engagement with UN peacekeeping does not guarantee matching interests and objectives with the EU. Thus far, there exists no coordination whatsoever between both sides on developing synergies in the planning of new and ongoing operations, mainly because of a lack of coordination on the European side, partly because of a lack of interest from the side of the military elites in

BRICS countries. If there are exchanges between Europe and the latter’s peacekeeping training programmes, these are managed by individual European member states.

Africa is one of the regions where the ambitions of the major powers have been creating new tensions. The European Security Strategy highlighted Africa as a particular area of concern to prevent state failure and war. “Europe should be ready to act before a crisis occurs.” During the Afro-European Summit in Lisbon in 2007, the objective was set to promote a robust peace and security architecture, to strengthen investment, and to promote good governance and human rights.³¹ Since 2005, the European Union has stepped up its efforts to engage the emerging states to work towards these objectives together. The Commission’s Communication on EU-China relations of 2008 expressed the willingness to establish a structured dialogue with Beijing on sustainable development in Africa and to support the sustainable development, transparency and the improving of governance.³² In 2007, a formal dialogue with China was set up. The need for joint action on Africa was also emphasized in regard to India, Brazil and South Africa. How much did these objectives materialize?

There has been virtually no communication or coordination with India, Brazil and Russia.³³ With South Africa, the EU has been interacting on issues like peacekeeping, Central Africa and Zimbabwe, but without much result.³⁴ The dialogue with China has resulted in two high-level meetings since 2007, but nothing specific has come out of it thus far. Both sides agreed to instruct their embassies and delegations in Africa to explore concrete projects for collaboration, but by June 2009, only three modest proposals were made. Europe wants to have full-fledged cooperation on both political and economic issues; the People’s Republic is sticking to agriculture, telecommunication and infrastructure.³⁵ It claims that working with the EU would be perceived by the Africans as hostile to their interests and that cooperation on sensitive issues should happen with the Africans themselves taking the driver’s seat. State consent is a prerequisite for whatever efforts are made to promote good governance and stability. The African Union is expected to define the broad action points for collaboration between the external powers. The European Union has endorsed this

principle of ownership, but as the African stakeholders are divided and reluctant to set such an agenda, ownership would imply inactivity. Elsewhere, I have demonstrated that China has been prepared to consider the adoption of international rules for its economic activities as long as these were not binding or constraining its maneuverability in affecting core interests.³⁶

The economic charm offensive of China and India is a quite recent phenomenon and the two countries are now increasingly experiencing the negative consequences of working with instable and badly governed states.³⁷ Since 2008, a debate has started within the Chinese and Indian government on how to deal with these challenges. Opinions seem divided between an even more *sovereignist* approach, supporting partner states

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whatever it takes, and constructive engagement with the EU and international organizations. While the latter option seemed to have been preferred initially, sovereignism is bouncing back. Again, nationalists do not want to be seen as obeying to “Western demands”. In both China and India there is a fear that joining forces with Europe on issues like governance would go at the expense of their economic interests.³⁸ Chinese and Indian officials are also reluctant to take the European Union seriously as a reliable actor, given its internal inconsistency and given the fact that individual member states have not refrained from undermining the EU’s own standards. Even though many Chinese believe that Europe could be a natural partner for maintaining security in Africa, it is not confident that the EU will deliver. Most important however is the deep distrust between China, India and the United States. Beijing still fears that the other two want to balance China or even contain its influence in Africa. The other way around, India is concerned about Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. It is this rivalry that will likely impede China to cooperate with Europe to address the multiple security threats related to bad governance and unbalanced economic growth.

The European Union has stated its interest in working with China,

India and Russia in addressing **trouble states** in Asia: Iran, Myanmar and North Korea. In all cases, the regional powers have refused to accept Europe as a partner of importance. Regarding Iran, Europe, China, India and Russia agree that Teheran should be prevented from developing nuclear arms. But while the EU sought to work with Iran while prioritizing staying the best friend of Washington, the others sought to work with the EU while staying Teheran’s best friend.³⁹ The trio has systematically opposed Chapter VII resolutions backed by France and the UK. Western sanctions are undermined by steady flows of investments and trade. Moreover, Beijing, Moscow and Delhi came to understand that the so-called E3 was often more a matter of and E1+1+1, as the UK, France and Germany interpreted their interests not always in the same way. In July 2007 and during the Geneva talks in June 2008 for instance, China successfully reached out to Berlin to deflect new sanctions backed by the UK and the US.⁴⁰ The situation is even worse in regard to Korea and Myanmar. In both cases the EU has tried to exert leverage via development cooperation - the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the UN Three Diseases Fund respectively - but apart from sporadic briefings, none of the trio has thought of serious cooperation with Brussels.⁴¹

Europe has been positioning itself as the leader in the combat against **climate** change. Banking on its advanced clean energy technologies

“Banking on its advanced clean energy technologies and ambitious policies it expected to gain both soft power and commercial profit. China and India have challenged this leadership.”

and ambitious policies it expected to gain both soft power and commercial profit. China and India have challenged this leadership.⁴² They criticize the European Union for not making enough efforts and find Brussels’ objective for a 20 percent reduction in carbon emissions by 2020 ridiculously low. They accuse Europe of using environmental concerns to keep developing countries down, and state that if it wants to prove the contrary Europe should provide more aid and transfer its precious knowhow for free. The recently announced 15 billion Euro of support for poor countries has been received with disappointment by China, Brazil and India. China in particular is catching up with its own

clean energy technologies and policies, in spite of a much lower development level. Even by the most cautious estimates, Europe's spending on clean energy falls behind China's annual budget that ranges between 30 and 40 billion Euro. The People's Republic is boosting its solar and wind energy capacity much faster than the EU. It is investing more in clean coal technologies than the 27 European member states together. All BRICS countries have recognized the need to join forces to curb carbon emissions, but even despite converging interests, both sides have achieved to reach a consensus over key policies and responsibilities. This disagreement has not only been a matter of diverging interests, but also of a lack of recognition of the EU's leadership.

5. Conclusions

The European Union has not been able to persuade the BRICS nations to collaborate on major international challenges. The evaluation of policy documents and the institutional mechanisms for bilateral communication indicated that no consensus was reached on the priorities for cooperation regarding important international political and security challenges. Looking closer at the behaviour of Europe and the emerging markets in matters that the European side highlighted as an important area for cooperation, it appeared that this deficiency in consensus is mainly due to a lack of normative convergence. While the European Union assumed that it could socialize the new powers and persuade them to incorporate Europe's own postmodern values, reality shows that this has not been the case. What is more, preferences of Europe and the BRICS have diverged in the framework of the United Nations. Countries like China and Russia became more active in setting up their own multilateral channels to advance their interests and norms. Even in areas where Europe and the new juggernauts have a clear common interest to work together, the former has failed to prove its leadership. Beijing, Moscow and Delhi might from time to time talk with Brussels about trouble spots and stress the need for stability. But the EU is not recognized as a capable stakeholder in the final decision making. Even

the challenge of climate change could not be turned into an opportunity for cooperation. This was partly because the developing countries gave priority to economic growth, but to a large extent also because the EU lacked the capabilities to meet part of their needs.

The normative disconnect will likely persist. There is an overwhelming majority of developing countries that becomes more assertive in defending its interests vis-à-vis a minority of developed countries. Different stages of economic development will continue to produce different political needs and diplomatic postures. While China needs to address inequality, states like India and Brazil still have to start their industrialization. These will be difficult processes that put a high premium on gaining economic influence abroad. This poses for Europe an awkward dilemma between further developing conditionality in its relations with emerging markets or abandoning its expectation of being a norm setter in the new world order.

The first option is excluded. The developing nations have showed themselves prepared to raise the costs. Beijing, India and Russia have bluntly rejected political conditions in the run-up to the negotiation of new strategic agreements. These countries do not tolerate being lectured anymore. This is partly because of growing assertiveness and awareness of their increasing power. Domestic politics also plays a role as new nationalism has increasingly impeded pragmatic leaders in making concessions. Equally important is the perception that European member states will never agree on which measures to take for enforcing political

demands.⁴³ And even if there is a credible threat – take for instance the allusions to imposing green import taxes after the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit – European sanctions could lead to more distrust and spiral out of control. This brings us to another obstacle: the lack of internal consensus in Europe. In

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the best case the new External Action Service can be helpful in formulating a more coherent policies, this process will take at least a few years. By then,

inconsequential and ineffective normative posturing could have completely isolated the European Union. Europe also should be aware that if the emerging markets continue to coordinate their positions within multilateral organizations, it has to accept that a democratic majority of developing nations will promote political and economic guidelines that are not always suitable to its own interests. Finally, it remains to be seen whether Washington will maintain its new realism. Particularly since the new decade, America has gradually abandoned its moral high ground and opted instead for very pragmatic cooperation with China, India and Russia. If America would definitely join a new concert of pragmatic powers – more concerned with stability than with liberal norms – Europe would position itself entirely in the margin of international politics.

In the current world order, normative conditionality cannot be productive. That is not to say that the European Union should give up its ambition to become an international norm setter. Some of its achievements, policies and standards could become increasingly relevant if the emerging states succeed in fulfilling their basic economic needs and strengthen domestic unity. Until then, the EU should concentrate on its liberal standards for internal use and ensure that it meets the preconditions of its postmodern policies: enhanced economic integration, political democracy and equal opportunities for its people. Even retired super powers can have a long life, if they keep in good form. This requires for example more ambitious economic innovation, support for private creative initiatives, increasing the effectiveness of governance and assuring that welfare for its citizens can be further developed. Only if Europe modernizes itself and succeeds in legitimizing its policies internally, might it have a chance to constructively engage the new giants. If it manages to uphold its economic competitiveness and raises its political effectiveness, Europe would inevitably obtain a stronger bargaining position in the new power politics of this century. Not strong enough to impose its conditions, but sufficient to ensure that its core interests are not harmed and that it maintains confidence in itself.

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¹³ International agreement database of the EU:

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/applications/Accords/doSearch.asp>

¹⁴ At the moment of writing this paper, it appeared that a full PCA would probably not be possible and that both sides would opt for a separate political and economic part instead.

¹⁵ Interview with European official, Brussels, 10 March 2009.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Revised action plan with India, p. 2, Action plan with Brazil, p. 2; Action plan with SA, p. 4; India action plan p. 3

¹⁸ Action plan with South Africa, p. 2. Revised action plan with India, p. 3.

¹⁹ Revised action plan with India, p. 3.

²⁰ Revised action plan with India, p. 3.

²¹ For example: Economy, Elisabeth (2001), *The Impact of International Regimes on Chinese Foreign-Policy Making: Broadening Perspectives and Policies... But Only to a Point*, in Lampton, David ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign Policy in the Era of Reform*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 230-257; Carlson, Allen (2006), *More than Just Saying No: China's Evolving Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention since Tiananmen*, in Johnston, Alistair and Ross, Robert eds., *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 217-237; Kent, Ann (2002), *China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organisations*, *Global Governance*, vol. 8 (3), pp. 343-365; Johnston, Ian (2003), *Is China a Status-Quo Power International Security* vol. 24 (4) p. 22; Holslag, Jonathan (2007), *China's Diplomatic Victory in Darfur*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 32 (6).

²² Economy, Elisabeth (2001), op. cit; Johnston, Ian (2003), op. cit., p. 18; Holslag, Jonathan (2007), op. cit.

²³ China, Russia Veto US Drafted Resolution on Zimbabwe, *China Daily*, 12 July 2008.

²⁴ Lake, David and Patrick Morgan (1997), *Regional Orders*, PSU Press, University Park PA; Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever (2003), op. cit.

²⁵ For example: Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (2000), *China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Co-operation Forum* (2002), *China-Arab Co-operation Forum* (2004), *India-Africa Forum* (2007), *Arab-India Cooperation Forum* (2008).

²⁶ For example: Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing, 20 September 2006; Communiqué of the Third Ministerial Meeting of The China-Arab Cooperation Forum, Manama, 23 May 2008.

²⁷ Choedon, Yeshe (2005), *China's Stand on UN Peacekeeping Operations*, *China Report*, vol. 41 (1), pp. 39-57; Bullion, Alain (1997), *India and UN Peacekeeping Operations*, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 4 (1), pp. 98-114.

²⁸ UN Peace Keeping Department, Annual Reports, see: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>

²⁹ Gu, Zhenqiu (2000), *Developing Countries Defend Principle in U.N. Peacekeeping Financing*, *People's Daily*, 12 March 2000; *Statement on Behalf of the G77 and China on the Financing of UNPKO*, New York, 18 May 2009.

³⁰ Holslag, Jonathan (2009), *China's New Security Policy Towards Africa*, *Parameters*, vol. 39 (2), pp. 23-37.

³¹ The Lisbon Declaration, adopted at the Summit between Africa and the European Union, Lisbon, 8 and 9 December 2007

³² Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - EU - China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities [COM(2006) 632 final] /* COM/2006/0631 final */

³³ Interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 6 November 2009.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Holslag, Jonathan (2008), *Commerce and Prudence, Revising China's Evolving Africa Policy*, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, vol. 9 (1), pp. 1-28.

³⁷ Alden, Chris (2007), *China in Africa*, ZED Books London; Taylor, Ian (2006), *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise*, Routledge, London.

³⁸ Holslag, Jonathan (2008), *Commerce and Prudence*, op. cit., p. 26.

³⁹ Interview with Chinese official, Brussels, 7 March 2009 (2); Interview with European official, Brussels, 10 March 2009.

⁴⁰ Interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 4 March 2009.

⁴¹ Interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 4 March 2009 (2).

⁴² Parikh, Jyoti and Kirit Parikh (2009), *Climate Change: India's Perceptions, Positions Policies and Possibilities*, OECD, Paris; Narendranath, K.G. (2009), *Jairam has a Copenhagen Axis: India, China, Brazil, South Africa*, *Indian Express*, 8 December 2009.

⁴³ For example: Christophe and Waheguru Pal Sing Sidhu (2009), *Does Europe Matter in India*, in Thierry Tardy ed., *European Security in a Global Context: Internal and External Dynamics*, Routledge London; Jain, Rajendra (2007), *India and the European Union: Parameters and Potential of Strategic Partnership*, in Rajendra Jain ed. (2007), *India and the European Union: Building a Strategic Partnership*, Radiant Publishers, Delhi, pp. 63-87; Mukhopadhyay, Alok (2009), *The First EU-Pakistan Summit*, *ISDA Strategic Comment*, 12 June 2009; Chen, Zhimin (2006), *Oumeng de youxian zhanlue xingwei zhuti texing yu zhongguo zhanlue huoban guanxi* [The impact of the EU's limited strategic behavior on EU-China relations: The case of the arms embargo], *Guoji GuanCha* [International Review], vol. 13 (5); Feng, Zhongping (2006), *Ruhe tuidong zhongguo guanxi shenru fazhan* [Explaining the Sino-EU strategic partnership], *Waijiao Pinglun* [Foreign Affairs Review], vol. 22 (5), pp. 16-22; Xing, Hua (2007), *Ouzhou yitihua fengyu jianchen wushizai* [The European integration through 50 years wind and rain], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* [International Studies], vol. 48 (6), pp. 10-16; Chizov, Vladimir (2005), *European Union: A Partnership Strategy*, *International Affairs*, vol. 50 (6).